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BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION

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COMMISSIONERS

SUSAN BITTER SMITH, Chairman BOB STUMP BOB BURNS DOUG LITTLE TOM FORESE 2015 JUN -4 P 3: 40

AZ CORP COMMISSION DOCKET CONTROL

) DOCKET NO. S-20916A-14-0328 In the matter of:

MICHELLE LEE WAGNER (CRD No. 2403647),

Respondent.

SECURITIES DIVISION'S REPLY BRIEF

**Hearing Date: March 4, 2015** 

Assigned to Administrative Law Judge Mark Preny

The Securities Division ("Division") of the Arizona Corporation Commission ("Commission") submits its Reply Brief ("Reply") to Respondent Wagner's Post-Hearing Brief and Response to Securities Division's Post-Hearing Brief filed on ("Response"). Capitalized terms in this Reply have the same definitions as in the Division's Post-Hearing Brief ("Brief"). This Reply is supported by the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities.

## **MEMORADUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

Most of the issues raised in the Response were addressed in the Division's Brief. A few additional points from Respondent's Response warrant discussion.

This case is the action of a regulatory agency and Wagner's contract/bankruptcy dispute with her former client is irrelevant. Respondent candidly admits that the additional facts described in her Response do not affect the elements of the actual violation at issue. Rather, these facts offer a "whole picture." Respondent attempts to characterize this action as largely being between Wagner and LP, a "vengeful" former client. Respondent suggests that her contract and bankruptcy disputes with LP may result in those courts not holding Wagner liable for any deficiency judgments from the loan at issue. While that is far from certain, it is irrelevant.

This action is for Respondent's violation of the Securities Act. These violations create a separate debt independent of Respondent's contract and bankruptcy disputes with LP. And they are brought by the Securities Division under its authority as a regulating agency, not on behalf of LP. It should be no surprise to Respondent that in the highly-regulated industry of securities sales, there are obligations and penalties that are separate from and in addition to those in non-regulatory, private-party disputes.

A violation of A.R.S. § 44-1962(A)(10) is a violation of the Securities Act subject to all the penalties listed in A.R.S. § 44-1962(B). Respondent argues that violating A.R.S. § 44-1962(A)(10) and 14-4-130(A)(15) is a "technical violation" of the Securities Act and that a violation of a rule prohibiting unethical and dishonest conduct is less serious than a violation for fraud. Respondent cites no authority defining a "technical violation" or for this position.

The Securities Act contains a separate provision for fraud. But that provision is not at issue. The violation, and the penalties available for that violation are both fond in A.R.S. § 44-1962. As stated in that section, a registered salesman who violates 44-1962(A) may be liable as described in 44-1962(B).

In cases where the Commission has entered orders against brokers for violation of 14-4-130(A)(15), the Commission has always ordered full restitution. Respondent correctly notes that two of the decisions cited in the Brief included a violation of A.R.S. § 44-1991 and two of the decisions included more than one customer loan. All four of these decisions were consent orders (i.e. the respondents cooperated with the Division in reaching an outcome, which was not the case here). In each decision except *In re Attila Toth*, the order included a higher penalty for the higher number of violations.

• In *In re Attila Toth*, the registered salesman obtained a \$70,000 loan from a client and did not use the full loan as represented. The Commission found that Toth violated A.R.S. §§

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In re Attila Toth, Docket No. S-20782A-11-0019, Decision #72507 issued on 8/3/2011.

44-1991 and 44-1962(A)(10). The Commission ordered a \$1,000 penalty and permanent revocation.1

- In In re Anthony Ray Stacy, the salesman obtained a \$130,000 loan from a client and failed to repay it. He also used the funds for personal use and the Commission found that Stacy violated A.R.S. §§ 44-1991 and 44-1962(10). The Commission ordered a \$10,000 penalty and revocation of Stacy's salesman registration.<sup>2</sup>
- In In re Britt M. Lachemann, the Commission found only a violation of A.R.S. § 44-1962(10), but there were three loans. The Commission ordered \$10,000 penalty and revocation.<sup>3</sup>
- In In re Lynn R. Goldney, the registered salesman solicited 26 customers for \$255,175 of loans. At the time of the Decision, Goldney still owed \$98,835 to 14 customers. For his violation of 1962(10)—no separate finding of fraud—the Commission revoked his securities salesman registration and assessed a \$10,000 penalty.<sup>4</sup>

As these cases make clear, the Commission has consistently ordered full restitution for violations of 44-1962(10), even when there was no fraud violation. Where there was more than one violation of 44-1962(10), the Commission ordered a higher penalty. Here, where there is only one violation, the Commission can be expected to order a smaller penalty.

Respondent argues that standards found in a FINRA publication should be used as guidance. These guidelines are not Arizona law. And using FINRA's guidelines to interpret 44-1962(10) would be an issue of first impression for the Commission. Because the Legislature has instructed that the Securities Act be "liberally construed to effect its remedial purpose of protecting the public interest"5 it would be inappropriate to adopt FINRA guidelines that might limit such a

In re Anthony Ray Stacy, Docket No. S-20909A-14-226, Decision #74849 issued on 12/18/2014.

In re Britt M. Lachemann, Docket No. S-20894A-13-0351, Decision #74239 issued on 1/7/2014. <sup>4</sup> In re Lynn R. Goldney, Docket No. S-20880A-13-0088, Decision #73766 issued on 5/8/2013.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Eastern Vanguard Forex v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n 206 Ariz. 399, 410, 79 P.3d 86, 97 (App. 2003)., citing 1951 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 18, § 20.

purpose, especially where those guidelines were not put forth by the Commission and the Legislature.

Respondent's subjective belief that LP was "like family" and LP's non-loan commercial transactions do not satisfy the exemption. The exemption in R14-4-130(A)(15) requires that the customer be a relative. Persons with whom the registered salesman developed a close relationship and considered to be "like family" (according to the salesman) do not meet the exemption. Adopting such a standard would not only be contrary to the plain language of the Rule. It would also make the exception so easily available that the prohibition on making loans would be rendered meaningless.

The exemption also requires that the customer not be in the business of making loans. Without citing the record, Respondent states that it was uncontroverted that LP had made loans similar to those he made to Respondent. The record, however, only established that LP later sold the foreclosed office condominium and received a promissory note as part of the payment. This is very different from the transaction at issue—an actual loan—where LP transferred money to Wagner for her to use to buy a property held in her own name in exchange for payments of interest and principal (not in exchange for a property).

Additionally, Respondent's ignorance of the loan-prohibition in A.R.S. § 44-1962 and her belief that the loan was in her client's interest are not elements of the statute or of the defense. The statute contains no state-of-mind requirement or defense. And Arizona courts have interpreted other Securities Act provisions lacking a state-of-mind requirement as creating strict liability.<sup>6</sup>

The Commission's order for any restitution would be a separate debt in bankruptcy created by a separate action—violation of the Securities Act. The bankruptcy proceedings, including whatever result comes from LP's adversary proceedings, do not affect the Commission proceedings or orders. The Division devoted space in its Brief to discussing the automatic stay in bankruptcy because this Court asked both sides to explain how bankruptcy affects the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> See e.g. State v. Gunnison, 127 Ariz. 110, 113, 618 P.2d 604, 607 (1980); see also Rose v. Dobras, 128 Ariz. 209, 214, 624 P.2d 887, 892 (App. 1981).

administrative proceedings. As the automatic-stay cases make clear, the bankruptcy proceedings do not affect this action. Cases dealing with the automatic stay are also relevant to Respondent's argument that there is no existing debt and that cases cited by the Division deal with situations where a debt for securities violation existed prior to the bankruptcy filing. The cases make clear that actions for violations of state securities law continue regardless of any bankruptcy proceedings. Section 523(a)(19) further establishes and the debt created from such securities law violations comes from any order "before, on, or after the date the petition is filed[.]" Thus an

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<sup>7</sup> See also *In re Jafari*, 401 B.R. 494, 499–500, (Bankr. D. Colo. 2009) (Section 523(a)(19)(B) still requires that "the liability determination occur outside of the bankruptcy forum, whether it occurs pre- or post-bankruptcy. Once liability has been imposed, then either a bankruptcy court or a non-bankruptcy court may determine the application of this nondischargeability statute." (Cited in Division's Brief).

This debt would not be dischargable in any subsequent bankruptcy proceedings. Respondent

argues that Section 523(a)(19) only applies where there is fraud. This is incorrect. The language of the

statute is clear; it applies to violations of state securities law. As noted in the Division's Brief, the

Georgia Bankruptcy Court correctly cites the statute as applying to all state securities law violations:

"Section 523(a)(19) expressly contemplates a postpetition determination of liability by a

nonbankruptcy forum for debts resulting from securities law violations as well as common law fraud,

deceit, or manipulation in connection with the purchase or sale of a security." Here, A.R.S. § 44-

1962 is part of the State securities laws and governs securities salesman, like Respondent.

restitution ordered. As noted in its Brief, the amount of restitution ordered is governed by statute<sup>10</sup>

and Commission rule. 11 Respondent suggests that any restitution ordered should take into account the

possibility that LP could receive future income from the office condo, even though he sold the condo

for a set price of \$180,000. As yet, all the payments of the sale price have not been made. Still, as

The Commission should not consider hypothetical, future income as an offset to

Consequently, violations of A.R.S. § 44-1962 are covered by 523(a)(19).

<sup>8</sup> 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(19).

order by the Commission creates a separate debt.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> In re Zimmerman, 341 B.R. 77, 80 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> A.R.S. § 44-1962(B).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> R14-4-308(C)(1)(a) & (b).

stated in the Brief, the Division would accept considering the full sale price as an offset. If LP ever receives additional income above and beyond this sales price, evidence of such payments could be considered as an additional offset to any subsequent collection on the restitution ordered. Similarly, if another court orders Respondent to make payments to LP, evidence of such payments would also be considered as an offset in subsequent collections. That, however, is a collection matter and separate from this proceeding.

## **CONCLUSION**

Repeating a portion of the Division's Brief: A.R.S. § 44-1962(A)(10) prohibits dishonest and unethical practices by a salesman in the securities industry. Commission Rule 14-4-130(A)(15) defines the unethical practice at issue: "Borrowing of money or securities by a salesman from a customer, except when the customer is a relative of the salesman or a person in the business of lending funds." As stated in the preamble to Title 14 of the Arizona Administrative Code, all persons who seek registration as a salesman must comply with the Commission Rules in Title 14.

LP, Ms. Wagner's customer, on her advice sold investment assets to invest in a real estate condo. The income from this investment would be generated by Ms. Wagner and her business. This transaction violated the Securities Act and LP ended up losing much of the value of the investment.

Based upon the evidence admitted during the administrative hearing and the arguments in the Brief and this Reply, the Division respectfully reiterates the requests for relief in the Brief.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED June 4, 2015.

Ryan J. Millecam

Attorney for the Securities Division of the Arizona Corporation Commission

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